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I
Perhaps the most i;,,poi·tant aspect of direct foreign investment is
that it is an.ir1stru8ent of international business integration.

It is

a means by which a f irrn can o~m manufacturing facilities and distribution

outlets in foreisn countries ~nd exercise direct control over their de-

cisions on production and sale.s.

Direct investment pt::rrnits

;m enlc::rgc

m·ent across internationnl bordE:rs of the srian_ of activities covered in

the :decision-r:w.kin g center of a sfoglc f irr.1., nnd :i.ts cxpc?,nsion in recent
years can be taken as a ceasuie-of the .~xtent of vertical and horizontal :i.ntcrnational integration an<l thc i11.crcased ir.!porumce of l!\llltin2.
tional firms,

What is the impact of these nultinetio~al firms on inter-

national trade and factor movements?

Large in size, broad in scope)

they frequently occupy a major, if not domine.nt, position in their in
dustry on a world-wide basis.

To what e;~tent do they increase trade,

cause technology to grow and spread rapidly, and help cipital to move
freely?

1'0 what extent do they inhibit inefficient exchange?

Would

other forms of internatiorial induitrial organization lead to better or

.

worse perfonaance?

1

.

On the positive side, it is-argued that multinational firms, because of their access to capital, technology,. and markets in many countries, can take advantage of discrepancies in world prices, and"in so

doing, help correct then and brine about better integration of the world
economy.

The multinational firm ~snuf2ctures ~~12re costs ere low and

-sells vhae the price :is hi~h.

It r2.1.ses capital yhe1·e :i.t is chear,est

i'

and j_nve sts it uher e it is 1wst procl uct_i v.e..
i

It spre ads the supe rior

techn olog y of on2 c6un try to othe r coun tries
in uhic h it oper ates .

It

is able to.do this to the exte nt that the inte
rnal burt aucr acy of the
firm tran smit s inf ormc.1 ticin more rep idly than
inte rnat iona l mark ets, -.rnd

overc omes barr iers to trade r,iore easi ly anc1
cf fid.e ntly .

The firm in

thes e case s subs t:i.tu tes for impe rfect mc-:c
kets in e.llo catin 8 good s and

fact ors.
Agai nst this must be set the prob lems crea ted
by the larg e size
and domi nant posi tion of some of the impo
rtant mult inati onal firm s.

Dire ct inve stme nt voul d not be_ the matt er
of grea t conc ern that it is

if it cons isted of many smal l firm s scatt ercc1
throu ghou t the ccohOi 1y,
each occu pyin g a mino r part of the indu stry
and beh2.':7ing j_n a competi-ti~e ly deter mine d f2sh ion. Inste ad, much of
it is 2sso ciate d with a
smal l muub er ~f larg e firm s in olig opo listi c
:i.nc lustr ics. Inso far as
1

ther e is a maj-o r prob lem asso cic;t cd with rml
tina tion al firm s, ·much

or

it

lies in the fact that , in thes e case s, com petit
ion is wecik and the finu
bas mark et powe r. If mark et forc es compel
beha vior , ther e is littl e
.... ,
po5.nt in inve stiga ting , as is ofte n done , whet
her fore ign firm s export more , trea t labo r bett er, rein vest more
etc. Perfo rman ce would
5
depe nd on supp ly c1nd dewand, and it woul d be
bette !" to focu s atte n
tion on thes e forc es than on th~ firm itsel f~
But it is an enti rely
diff eren t 0att er in indu strie s wher e a firm
, by re·as on of its domi nant

posi tion , has scop e for choi ce.

Rere it cert ainl y rnak~s sense · to ex-

amine perfo rm~n ce, n~t- only from the econ bmic
poin t of vie~ , but fro~
the polit :lc2: l side as ,;-;211. Larg e con~ c:ntr ation
s of po,10 r in priv 2te

-3corporation s c.an havC'. serious politic.al cor,.,r:;equcnc2.s which nrc consid-·

erahly :.:,.ggravatec1 uhcn the firm is 11ot · only J.a~:ge

$

but for.eign, -and

American at that,

If not pressed too far, there is much to be learned by comparing
the problei:\S currently cree.ted by the rnultin:ottion c1l firms with devel-

opruents in the United States at th6 end of the nineteenth century.
The cmereence of nat:ional firms uhich acco;:ipz:nj_cd the development of a

nati9nal market at that time helped, as Rincllcberge r poi~ts out 1 to
equalize wages, interests, and rents within the United States. 2 But it
a~so led to widespread fears and the antitrust laws.

There was great

suspid.oni sonctirnes justified, someti.nes not, of the po1.-;er of these
new industrial giants to create serious econmdc problems thro;_13h the
suppression of competition and serious political problems through the
concentrati on of power,

Concern about ."the fate of small producers

driven out of business or depri~ed of ~he opportunity to enter it by
1

all-powerfu l aggregates of capital'" and about

11

the power of monopolists ·

to hurt the public by raising.pri ce 1 det~riorati ng products, and restrict
ing production" was a pri-nciple ~otive behind the Sheman Act·. 3 On ·the

political side, "concentrat ion of resources in the hm1<ls of a few was
viewed as a •Social and politice.l catastrophe ," a belief, as Ka;l_sen and

Turner point out, ,-~hich "can be rationalize d in terr:is of Jeffer~;onia n
symbols of wide political appeal and grc~t pcrsisteuc~ i~ American life:
busit1ess units are poliiicall.y irresponsib le and therefdre large business unJts 2re

0
Cl ....
::>'"'"
l~o'-"· rOL"S
I

114
•

The sinilarity bet•,,eer. the Ame.ricc::n f e2.rs of the 12.rge corpprcttion

~nd· the ones now voiced in Europe to~2r~~ t11c cultin2t{nn al corporation

--· ··-

.•

.

____ ._:

suor-e sts n closer lo.ok at the A:uerican r.ntitr ust l2ws desi_~n
ed to <lcal
"'"'

-

with this proble m.

Th~se are f«r froi:1 perfe ct, e.nd serve more a 9 a uoc1-

el to be stt•die d than

0"1e

to be copied , but they do provid e a large b,ody

of experi ence on the pi."_ocess of exami ning, ev2lu ating, and attemp
ted

r·emedying of proble ms of indus trial organ izatio n.

For examp le, it has

at ti'mes been found necess ary in the Un:i.ted States to br:i.ng
about: a dis

soluti on of giant fin11s (e.g., Standa rd Oil and Ameri can Tobacc
o in 1911) 1
to subsid ize new conpe titors (e.g., in the aluminum indus
try), to pre

vent merge rs, and to curta il the firm's choice of.sal es method
s (e.g.,

United Shoe }!achi nery, Intern ationa ·l Busine ss Hach:.i.nes), to n2me
a few
cases.

~-)hiJ.e one ce.nno t judge t•:hether simila r ac~_ion is nezc1ed in the

intern ationa l contex t witho ut much n ore inf orrn=1tion them
t-:c no~-1 have
1

availa ble, the United States antitr ust experi ence seerns
a useful ave-

nue to explor e in lookin g for preced ents for collec tive action
on foreign invest ment.

The most impor tant lesson perhap s is the diffic ulty of applyi
ng
antitr ust laws, partly due to the weaknes.? of

OL1r-

tools of econom ic a:-,

nalys is and partlr clue to an inhere ntly apbigu ous attitu de.

Fortas poin~s

out that there has always been in the United States an ambiv alent
attitude to--rard s big busine ss) a "ror,w .ntic view of the achicv er,1ent
s and cfficicn cy of large indus trial organ izatio ns" couple d with
a "suspi ciot1s
vlet-1 of their pCi•!er. 115 This is parall eled _in the ~conct 'li~ litera
ture

by disagr eemen t on wheth er large size inhib its perfor mance
becaus e of

the lack of co~~e tition or irnprov 2s it b2caus 2 of eco~o ~ies
of scnl2.

~imil arly, on the intern ationa l scene most count ries find theose
lves
in~ dilcm~ a w~en formu lating policy on foreig n inv2st ~cnt; on
the one

•

-5hanp., they focl they need the contribution that foreign capitd c:mcl tech

nology can make, and on the other, they fear the l2rgc corporation ..
The
c1Hf iculti~s of separating .out the acl.vantazes ancr dange.rs of
.
:

large firms should not be minim:i.zed, but neither should they deter us

from a serio:..1s conside.re.tion of the great changes in industrial structure no\.; occurring.

The United States laws probc.bly uorked more to pre--

vent overt collusion than to prevent high concentration.

The increase

in concentration came about before 1900 and little was done to reverse
it, though the antitrust laus m.?.y have prevented it from increasing.

"The struggle against si.ze \·1as _· largely lost in the merger movement of
.

1897-1901," writes E. S. Fason,

6

ancl. the lesson of this for the inter-

national ecorior.1y is perhaps thzt now is a propitious time to act, while
things are still in a state of flux.

There is a danger that the present

policy, more concerned with collusiv~ agreaments than market shares,
and with nationality rather than r.iarl~et pouer, will permit large increase

in concentration in international markets which \·Till later become dif-

ficult if not impossible to reverse.

The rev~rsal of policy towards

.....

cartels may prevent overt collusion but encourage merger, while the attempt to countervail American firms may lead to amalgamations that re-

duce concentration, (e.g., present developments in the automobile in
dustry).

The result may be new restrictions on trade by firms, to off-

set the gains from removing the old restrictions by_goveirt~ent.
The historical record on direct investoent strengthens the sense

of

urgency, for it suggests that patterns oice set teri<l to ~r~vail for

lonz periods of ti~2.

The basic patter~ of.direct inv2st~~nt.aro ie early

in this century atid ch~nged little in the noiwal course of events.

}~st

-6of the fj_rms nou c1ord,!i'.!nt bc'.gan their opera tions befor
e 191!; ac1ct some
even bef6r e tJ1at. 7 There was little tende ncy for their
posit ion to be

erode d throu gh time.

Their branc h plant s and subsi diari es, inste ad of

~ithe ring a0ay, expan ded more o~ less at the same rate
~s their indu~ f~j,
and on the averaf ;.:!, maint ained their marke t share . 8
If this past :i.s ·any
~r:J.t eria, ve nw.y hazar d the guess that a neu patte
rn will crnerg e out

of the gr"eat chang es no·t.-1 occur ring, and thDt it too will
remai n stabl e
for a long perio d.
..
.

N01:-1

9

t-:ould sce~t a eood time to decid e uhich mm pat-

tern is mos~ _desir ab~c.

•

•
II

.
) or,. t'11~ eviaencc
. '
.
. l mar~et
,
. • •
.
experience
on t h,e sizean~
position
o·f t h e im-

po_rtant rnultinatio0~l f:i.n~1s.

!1s the d2ta are vc-..:y inco1!1plete) only teu-

ta~ive conclusi0ns can be drawn from them, but a few consistent charac-

teristics

se6ra

to emerge.

The American finis that· account for the bulk of direct investment

are fet-1 in nurnher and large in size.

AccorcH.nB to the 1957 Census (the

latest available), the 50 largest investors account for 60 per cent of
the total United States direct investrne11t~ \-1hile the 100 largest account
for over 70 per cent, and th~ 300 larg~st for over 90 per cent. 10From

annual reports, it was possible to identify 90 of ~he largest of these
and obtain an estlraate of their present_sizc.

Their distribution in

ll
terms of their total assets in 196l: uas
as f ollous: ·

Asset siz'2

Hurilber of firr;i.s

(dollc1rs)

in each class
---------

Cumulative.
numbe1: of fin.1s

over 10 billion

2

2

2 1/2 to 10 billion

8

J.O

20

30

500 million to 1 billion

20

50

200 to 500 million

30

80

100 to 200 million

10

90

1 to 2 1/2 billion

....

.
..

.

These leading direct investors seem often to be in industries ~~1ere
there are only a fe1-1 firms, each Hit!, a larze share of the 17?.ctrket.

A

rough COD!:)c..rison of the mc:i.jor United States investors •:ith the A:n2ric2.n

tratcd industries.

Approsirnately 40 per cent of these firms are-in i~-

..

dust~ies uhere the concc~tretion ratio is greater than 75 per cent.
For the Ui.1it:cd States as a whole, the correspondine figure is much lo•;-ier;

only 8 per cent of the total value of shipraents occurs in indLlstrics
\1here the. conccnt"cetion ratio is higher thcc1n 75 per cent~ 2 Dunrdng 's

·detailed stucly for the United Kingdom sho,-,ed in striking fashion thnt
nearly every Americ2n branch plant was in an industry ~-here it u2s the
clominant producer or one of a small nurnber

summa~fzed,

11

of

producers.

As Dunnin~

three quarters cf the employrnen~_in the United States af-

filiated firmi is concentrated in industries 1j1ere the five largest comc: 0 percent
.
'
1•
petitors zupp 1 y B
or. more
o~f tne
tota 1__ output. •· 13Ot h er stucies

• ·c anaoa;
'J.l:E•urope~lS anc.' I.,ustr,::>.112:
~- lG'
h 1 ess
tnout3,.

1n

d eta1·1'
l
en anc11 cs.s conc_u··

si':7e, point in the sam2 dir.ection.

It cou12 be argued that the association of hieh concentration and
d5.rect investnent is not accidental, but is inherent in the very nature

of the subject.

I

This provides atlded support for looking at direct in-

vestment iri terms of oligopoly, though the primary justification is to

be found in the facts on market structure themselves rather than this
tentative hypothesis on their cause.

Ouning an enterpries in a foreign

country can be exceedingly costly due to the exchange ris!:s involved,

.

the difficulty of obtaining
. inforr.iation and coordinatin.:; over long dis-

tances, the disaclv2ntsg~s of being foreign, etc.

Some special features

~re needed to offset these disadvantages, and these ari no~ likely to be
found in cm2petitive industries ~-,here entry is e:::.sy.

~-Yhere thi:!re are

n6 large econo~ies of scale or lars~ differences in cost curves or product differentiation , national firms ~ill have the edvant23e and_w{ll

pred6minete.

But where entry is difficult, an ·incenti~e to'•forci~n

•
-9-·

investment arises.

For exar~le, if a firm has an adv~ntaee - a patent,

a differenti~ tcd product, a superior technical kno\1ledgc: a better access
to. capital - it c2n offset the dis~dvantag e of bein3 foreirn,

The stronger

.the advant~ge, the grenter the ability to overcome the disadvantag e, and

alRost by definition> the highe~ the degree·6f concentrati on.

Moreover,

the decision on wh2ther the advantage can be sold and the bother of direct

ownership of a foreign subsidiary avoided is critica~ly ?ffected by the
presence Qr absence of other barriers to entry.

If the advantage is to

be 11.censed, rentec.1, or otherwise sold to a l2;rr;e nunber of buyers ·who

act as price takers, it may be easy to maximize qeasi rents by setting
the monopoly price and selling to all taters.

But if, due to economies

of scale or oth2r factors, there .are only a feu ffrms in the industry,

, the f irrn selling the advantage f ir.cls_ itself in a bilateral olisopoly
.. sfruatiori and nay need dir.ect imiestr.1ent to obtain the maxi1:iun: return.
l

•

I

For this reason we sometir-.1es even find olizopolist ic firms from different
countries establishin g subsidiarie s in each others' countries, in order
to utilize their adv2ntage rather than selling it to their competitors .

Even in the absence of differences in technology or product diff'erentiation, barriers to entry arisin3 fror:1 econo~ies of scale can lead
to direct invest~ment, if it results :in highly j:r.iperfect internation al

markets.

.

Direct investment may,then be need~d as

'

2

bargaining sirategern.

A firm in one count_ry 8ay, through direct inve.strr,ent. merge with its

c6:npetitor or est;:,.blish a fo.rei3n subsidiclry in order to gain a strategic
-advantage;

2

buyer of a raw material rnay ~se direci investment to cir-

cl!:-:vf,,,t 2n irnIJerfect t:J.rl'.Ct 2r.d oht&in its ra.,1 oate~ial r:io1·e che2pl:;.

..
·-10-

Whenever compe tition in intern ationa l Datket s is imperf ect, there will

be mutual interde pcn~2n ce of enterp rise i~ differe nt countr ies and internati oncl integr ation as a means of taking advanta ge of that inter-

depende nce..

-,_

III

How arc ,ie to cvalurtte th2 impact of direct j_nvcst1:1cnt?

Suppose

an icdustry consists of a f ('.U large American fin·,s prevented by anti
trust 1aFs from ovc:rt collusion an<l a l<irgc1·_ number of European firms
pei"haps cooperating in c>. cc.:rtel 2.rrc:mgc;:1ent.

A change in internat:i.o"i wl

economic conditions le,:i.ds to the invasion of the Europe2.n market by American. _firms.

'

.

The Ar.!e.rica~1 f j.rms m2y lwve a decisive advantage 5 in

which case they acquire a lc1r3e: share o.f the E1Jropc,.m market: or the
European firms m2.y be able to cour..ter Americ<1n entry by mcrgin3 into large
firms,. i.e., become m~ltination al th~~selvcs.-

In either case, the result

.is a few giant firms, American end Europe2n > ~-,h:i.ch cloMinate the industry anc1 eventually set_tle into so;:1c oli3opolis tic collusion, tacit or

overt.

Will ~crforrnance in this industry be bctt~r than it was after

this r2.dical change in industrial organizatio n?
it could be?

Hhich countries benefit?

TTill it be as good as

T-)hich are hurt?

is so <lifficult that one hardly knows where to be5in.

The problem
Huch h2s changed

in the in<lustry; there was not a golden age of efficiency at the begin

ning, nor at the enc1.

I propose in this paper to break the problera

and deal uith one or tuo aspects that isolate major issues.

It seems...,

useful for these purposes to treat separately the problems of con:rnodity
flows, technology, and c2.pitalJ e.nd · to discuss the positive and negative
forces at work in each crlse.

This does not permit over-a11 ·conclusion s,

but it does help nal:c a start.
Direct invest~ent can changeboth the location of productibn and the
competitive structure of the industry.

the flow of eoo<ls, consider an
,n important harrier to entry.

To illustrate the effects on

of scale provide
Tl1c industry _8ay nonetb~less be conpet-

•

itive if transp ort costs 2rc low and wi<lcspre~d consum ption provid es
an intern 2tiona l market large enough .to suppor t cany fir19G,

lu this

co~pct itivc case, produc tion will be concen trated to tnke fulles t advantag e of ec?no~ ies of scale; each firm will operate at a point wl1ere
costs are rising , price will be cq~al to margin al costs, and only normal profit s will be earned •
.

-

Suppos e instead thst the to~al world nar~et is small, relativ e to
the optimum size plant, and there is room for only a fev produc ers.

These ·oligop olists, recoen izing the mutual interde pcc<len ce of their
action s, ,1il~ not co~pet e to th~ point of driving price to ~argin al
costs, but ,.,ill most likely cooper ete to restrai n cori1pe.tition ai,d to
enhance profit s.

Two types of ineffic iency are likely to prevai l in

tioi_!_ measur ed by the excess of price over roc?.rginal costs.

.In order

to ma:i:ntain abnorm el profit s, the firms will jointly res.tra in output

and raise price, and under the usual assump tions, ~his leads to a misalloca tion of resour ces.

Sec~n<l, there will most likely be also an

interna tion2.l _t_rade ~~is tort ion becaus e produc tion will not be concen - ...
_
trated to obtain maximu~ advanta ge of econoraies of scale.

Cartel agree

ments and especi ally inforFl al collusi o~s are seldo~ strong enough to
cut out produc tion by ineffic i~nt firms; instead they often act ~s
an
I

umbrel la to protec t a ceitain number of high cost produc ers.

Costs

are therefo re likely to be higher than under perfec t compe tition be-

cause of ineffic ient alloca tion.

merge throu~h direct investm ent into one interna tional parent firt

----

..

:-·13-

owning nncl contro lling all produc tion c>.nd

i:!2.XJ.,~t1 ZJ.n 0

The pn~vio us cartel~ ·haii1pcre<l by c>.ntitr us~ 12.r,;s

'1~·tc1

global profits ?
the inhere nt dif

ficulty of securj_n~: co,~:pJ.cte ar.reem ent, ~-•as unable to achieve r:w;d.mum

joi.nt pr_ofit .

Direct investo ent Hill remove some of tlv~se obst2.c .les,

and more perfec t coordi nation will be possib le, as the multin ationa
l
firm will be free to mmdmi ze prof its fully.

The improv ed coordi nation

will increas e one of the distort ions noted above and decrea se the
other.

First, the integra ted £inn, by raising price to the point of 6aximurn
.profi ts, vill increas e dortor tion due to monopoly power.

Second , in

an opposi te directi on, the fiJm will be free to alloca te produc tion
in the most effecti ve manner .

It 0111 b~ able to close down ineffi -

cient produc ers and concen trate produc tion to minimi ze costs.

The cost

curve of the indust~-:y ~-Jill b2 lm1ere d, perhap s even to the extent of
.
' prices
1 ea d ing
·
to a f·a·11 in
'
to tne
consum er. 17

Interna tioriril integra tion of busine ss through direct investm ent
usually stops short of being _comple te; instea·d . of one domina nt firm,
there are severa l with branch plants and s~bsid iaries in v~riou s coun
_tries, neithe r colludi ng comple tely or compet ing comple tely.

Indus- '·

tries such as this are often cyclic al, and havz pcri_o<ls of intense

compe tition followe d by relativ e quiet~

At a.tice such as the presen t

·when ne.w i:wrket s are opened up arid ne\,r trade p'attern s create d,
coI:Jpe•

titian is likely to intens ify as firms establ ish strateg ic positio ~s.
t-Ihen the new change s are absorb ed, the industr y may then settle· into
a .period of ·stabil ity of market shares 2.nd coll us ion on prices .

The

effect of any specif ic act of direct invcstn cnt is thus ~rabi8u ous· it
may be po.sitiv e or nes.2.ti ve depend in~ µpor,
\

t- 1heth•~r

it increa ses corilpe

•

-14titian ~r decre~scs it, whether it improve3 the firm's ability to produce efficiently or lessens it.

Our judRcment of the present flow

of direct investic.~nt depends very r:.uch on our horizon.

In rnost cnses)

the entry of United St~tes firra.s into ~urope has p~sHive effects in-_
stimulating COi,:~ctition and inproving resource allocation, often to
the disquiet of existinc firms.

petition

:lS

But if the current increase in com

bought at the .expense of increased r.12:rket power in tEe

long run due to a reduction of the nunber of firms, the short-run
gains ~ay be more thnn offset by long-run lois6~.

-·

IV
In most cases of direct investment~ the key el0Jent is the transfer of ·technology and cntrcpreneurt;hi :.l.

•Finns clrc very uiwqual in

their ability to 0_2ercJ.te in industry: tl~cy vary in sl:.ill, eff idcncy,
_-resources, etc.

3

end di.rect investment i~; a uay in \-1hich a firm with

so;ne a.dv[mtc•.ge can put it to use in ct fcrc:ign country.

The Amed.can

firm t!1at e:-:tablishes or expands a subsic1J.2ry in Europe is usually

using some kind of superiority it has over at least some of its Europea~ rivals - more experience in techniques_ of mass production,
more experience with certain consu~er good~ more ~Jiclely used in the
United Sietei, bettei eccess to-technology developed throu3h the war
effcn:t, che8.p capital fror:i their

0 1.m

larr,est resources or from spe-

cial -contact uith the New York capital market, a favored positioP in
hiring skilled 1\v:ericc1n pe!'sonnel 3 or· a lop cost source of rau material through their dirett investments i~ underdeveloped countries.
Similarly, the European and• Canadian firms ,-.-·hich engaec in 9i

rect investment usually have some advantage Enablinc thim to over
come the difficulty cf operating abroad and to meet local competition,
Interestinr,ly enoueh. thE!SC firris tencl to be in· the same industries as

·the American multinatior.al fir.ms,. shoi-ling t}1at technolory, entrepre
neurship, and product differentiaiion are not one-way streets.

The

petroleurn 3 soft drinks, paper, s6ap, far~ machinery, business machines,

tires and tubes 3 s~1ing machines, concentrated milk products, and

biscuit industries all provide examples in recent yec1rs w~ere Am~rican
finis h«ve large foreign investr:1c:1ts r.:nd one of the fin.1s oper2ti:1p,
in the United States is

2

branch plant 6f a forei~n firm.

The subsidiary of a wultin2tional fir~

...

can therefore usually

•

-16supply consu8 cr goods or produc er goods at lower cost than at least some
nation al f:i.rr!!s; the c1irc·ct investE :.ent thLts •!.i:111rovcs ccono1;1ic pi:!rforn:
<1nce

by_makinc capita l and technol ogy from one ~ountr y availab le to anothe
r.
This cs_pect is often stresse d in the trade literat ure .as the mo.st im-

portan t fcncU.o n of direct investm ent:. the multin ationn l firm, by apply-

ing the most advanc ed techni cal and ~anage rial sl~il!s .to its operati ons

.

througl 1out the world, facilit etcs the flow of technol ogy arid entrep rcneuria l ability betwee n countr ies, and helps bring about intern ationa
l

cost equali zation .
A so.iic,,:hat ciif f crcnt point of view can be found in some of the
.

.

antitru st literat ure) about the bsst way to proDot e technol ogy an~
~ntrep reneur ial efficie ricy.

There, it is stresse d that the advan

tage a firm posses ses is a barrie r to entry of othe:r finr:s.

The

greate r' the advant age, the greate r the barrie r to entry, and the less
the degree of ,compe tition.
I

Attenti or, is thus focused on ways to lo1-1cr

these barrie rs and increa se compe tition.

In some cases, it is sug-

gested that in order to promot~ compe tition, firms be preven ted from
using fully their advant aees and forced instead to make them availab le
to their compe titors on an equaf basis.

This always has two ~ides.

Restri ctions on the use of an advanta ge filay preven t its fulles t use

and inhibi t the'dls covery of new ones.

On the other hand, if there

I

I

are no restiic tions and the firm obtain s a monopoly positio n, the
price paid for the 2dvanta ge rnay be too high, and future innova tion
inhibit ed becaus e of the lack of compe tition.
The antitru st traditi on leans toHards co~~ct ifion r2th2r than·

size to obtain efficie ncy and srrn-,th .

\

r~ysen 2.nd Turner , in their

-17sora8~1tt radical

(fro □

the paint of view of existing practice) approach,

i
"
..
sugce~t
tnat
t_nc
burd2n of proof be on the f in1s to j ust.ify their size

and th~t doubts should be resolved
'

ra tncr trwn
•

f

...

•

t • •

.

• ~l-. 11

nfr1

favor of reducin~ market po1,1er

An important ground for their belief

maJ.n u1n1ns l

is an assumption that adventagcs are perhaps transitory and that

rathe~ than allo11in~ the~ to lead to iPcrcascs in concentration, it
is better to protect long-nm effid.cncy by maintdnin 6 numbers.
11

1~.rge penwnent differences in econor,1ic effic:i.cncy amoPg f in:1s 11 they

feel; m.·c lieither non-e:-dstent

or

rare'· ar.d

111

-,here a particul2r firm

~oes have an 2dvantage in men and methods, rivals can and uill copy
the ·methods and hire

-

,.18

the m~n. ,-

The antitrust approach can be ap?lied to the. international econo1:1y

as uell.

The beneficial side of direct investcc~t. is t~at it allows

firms freedom to apply their c.dvantap,es thr"ouehout the '\·1orld.

Phether

this forci is ~lw~ys the cheapest vay to spiead existing technology
and the surest t•:ay to promote ne~-, ones is another r.1atter.

If the f irrns

were restricted sornew~at in their choice, better results might be ob
tained.

In other words, so~e advantages· possessed by fin-:is

fro □

one.. _·

country-may be vie0ed as barriers to entry and ways sought to break

them clown rather than nwintP..in thcr:i.
Would it be pos-sible in

s0:-::i,2

licensing, or at a lower cosi?
pa:i.cl to this probler;i.

cases to obtain the adn.ntage through

Surprisingly little attention has been

The argument that international firms c1re needed

to transfer technolory rapidly inplics t!:at no other alternative is

available.

Phy is it not possible ·to h2vc intcrnetional ra~rkct~ for

technology instead of relyinr on the ~ureaucracy 6f firms?

This sub-

. - -18jcct is too comp licat ed to go into in deta
il here , but it is in~o rttn~
to note that ther e need not be a har~o ~y
of inte rest betw een the fi~m 's

choi ce of the best \-,ay to tran sfer Hs adva
nt~g e - i.e. , the vay whic h m·md .mizc s ;tts prof its - and the best . choi
c~ for tbe coun try·- i.e. , the
·one whic h aJ.lo,-,s it to obta in the adva ntag
e at lm-:e r cost .

In smn.e case s,

the firm choo ses c!ire :ct inves tr,1c1 1t ·with its
attcn <len t c1if ficu l ties
beca use it iLlpr oves cffic ~enc y and remo ves
unce rtain ty, but in othe r
case s the 0oti ve is to prot ect its posi tion
from othe r firm s, to esca pe
regul c:1U. on, or to obta in maxirrn1m quas i rent
s.

It is inter e.sti ng to note

that J[1.pc;1.nJ ..whic h has f ollo~12c1 a very str:i.
ct pol:L cy on dire ct inv~ strae nt,
seem s to have had cons idcru ble succ ess in
obtai rli1~ g, throu gh licen sing
aere emen ts, sor:2e of t:1e adv~ ntc1g es othe r
coun tries obta in throu gh dire ct
inve stme nt.
Anot her ques ti~n is \-Jhe ther dire ct. inve stme
nt is th_e best way to
prom ote <lynar:iic tech nolo gica l chan ge.

Supp ose an Ame rican firm:1 by dint

of its supe rior techn olog y or acce ss to capi tal,
is able to. take over
a sj_g nific ant shor e of a fore ign indu stry prev
ious ly cons is tine of a t~um
ber of smal l firm s.

On the one hand , there are the bene fits flow ing

from the grea ter effic ienc y of the Ame rican
firm : agai nst this must be
set the wors enin g of the corr\ petit ive stru
ctur e.

Is the resul tir>.g hi.eh -

ly conc entra ted indu stry· the best stru ctur e to
prom ote inno vatio 2?
I

Migh t it not be desi rabl e to pros ote coop
etiti on in this indu stry even
at the risk of shor t-ter m inef ficie ncy?

Supp ose, for exam ple, that re-

stric ticn s ~,ere pla.c ~c en the P..neric2.n fiY.:1 1
s marl. .et shar e 2r.d it uas

•

.

·;

nology Hhich n:l.r,ht very ucll grou throur1~ tine.
the cost of this restrict5.\•e policy 11ou_ld

('.;ror-;

As the gq: increased,

lari;;er, but so uould the

vote expanded effort to correctir~·their deficiencies 2nd iP the pr6cess

p~rhaps even discover few ways su~erior to those-of the Pmerican firm.
To par~phrase Kaysen ~nd Turner~ can ve 2ssuRQ that large permanent

differences between nations arc unli~e]y end that even thou~h firms from
a particular country have an aev2ctage et one point in time, other cac
learn to do just as uell.

In other Horrls > it might p3y to protect son:e

ineffici6nt firmi in order to encoura~c conpctiti0n in research an2 ~e_velopr:ient.

If: overdone, this policy coulc:1 lend to ?-reat Faste 2nd in-

efficien~y, but if h2ndled judiciously 2nd accorn~anied by other measures
to improve the co~munication of technolo~y, it mi~ht be sensible in

some instances.
There is therefore so:ne ser:.se to interferin~ ·r;7ith dfrect investment
on the grounds of the infant firm arpument f0r protecti0~.

Indeed~ the

case appears stronger than for the infant industry ar~u~cnt 1 under uhich,
sometimes, a tariff is j_p1posecl anc! foreien firr..s are nlloFed or ever!'·
encouragec to e~:"tablish branch plaP.ts.

The country obtains an inefficient

-·

industry. t-ihile the forei~n fin, obtains ~ ·suhsiciy plus a larr,e sh~re of
whatever learning docs occur.

I

•

This is not to sug~est th~t nBtional firms

should be pronot~d merely on the ~rounds of nationality; r~the~ that it
might p~y to protect firms on the 8rounds of variety~
vould be to have niny multin2ti0~2l

fir □ s.

The ide~.1 cas~

V

Direct inve.strn<:.n t recove red much norc rc::picl.ly
vestme nt after the war.

t'.1211

portf oJ.io in-

As a re~ult , multin ationa l firms have been one

6f the main instru2 ents for the interna tional transfe r of private long~
term capito l in recent years.

TTe night briefly consid er here one or

two. poiz:its on the c-.bilit y of the r:iultina tior:2.J. fin:! to :;uhsti tutc for

banks and other fin2nc ial inter2e diaries 1~ the efficie nt alloca tion of
the world' s capita l.
-To begin, consid er the role of wultina tio11~1 l fin'ls in

.intern ationa l financ ial institu tions are
relativ ely perfec t.

world \·!here

dcquat e and capita l market s are

In that c2se, ~irect investn ent would have little

effect on the structu re of intere st rates or
cation of capita l.

H

011

t~e intorn ationa l ello-

In this perfec t 11orla, a multin ation3 l firm's choice

betwee n raisin~ funds i~ ~e~ York or Paris tiill have little effect on
'the ultinc: te pattern of c2pite l flor1.

If it borro,,~ecl in r~eF Yor!-:.~ it

would cause the intere st rate there to rise end capita l Poul<l flow
to
the United States to replace in part its borrou in3 •

.If instead , it

borrow ed in Paris, it would cause intere st r~tcs there to rise and
capita l would flo~, to Paris.

Thou~h gross flows would differ in the

two cases, the final net flow would be simila r in propor tion as capita
l:

market s are perfec t, 4.e., to the extent that there were no barrie rs
to free movi:me nt.

The importa nce of intern3t ionc.1.l firf'.ls to capita l

movements therefo re depend s on the fac~ that in the real world, capita
l
market s are highly iMperf ect.
t!hat is the inp2ct of r:1ultin 2tfono. l fin1s- ia 2 ~1c,r1d !-!he:re info._·-

-21are important f2.ctors?

The 111ultinat:!.o nal fin!S uould seem to be ideally

plac.ed to c~rcur,wcnt these! ,barr3.ers; they ar·e in contact: uith capital
marl:ets in nany cou.ntr:tes _and are l2rge enough to tal:e a,Jvantr.ge of
econoDies of scale in borro-c-dng.

I3y borronin2 in those countries T-Jhere

capital is plentiful and lending ~~1ere it i~ scarce, the internation al
firm both t12xir:dzcs its oi-m prof its and alloc2.tes cf.pital between coun-

tries more effectively .

One mi~ht expect that ~ot only uould_they use

"their internation al connection so as to draw their capital from the
,
.
h
. l
.
,
. , even
c l1eapest r.iar,wt
Hl eac. particu ar J.nstat.. . ce) l, 19}out tney
rr\1£nt
step

acting as internation al financial intermedia ries, lend to other firms

less advantageou sly placed.
Their behavior so far does not se2~ to bc~r out this conjecture.

Instead~ they appear ~o behave as if co~straine<l ~o a some~~at inflexible
'I

pattern of: f in~nce i-rM.ch does not allot., them to vary greatly in adjusting to local capital conditions.

what as follous:

The patterri that emerges seems so~e

the American parent firm provides the equHy finance

for its subsidiary and borrows much of the non-equity secud.ties locc.Ily.
Statistical ly, the over-all pattern of United States direct invest
ment is as follows.

(The data are for 1957, the date of the last census,

but the figures on flou of fund~ sug~est that the pattern has b~en main·tained.)

In that year, the total assets of American subsidiarie s abroad

was about forty billion dollars, 60% of which was finan~ed from American
sources end 40% frov lotal sources.

The iocal participati on was confined

lare~ly to non-2quity securities; e~uity securities sold to local investors
iccouuted for oniy ~% of total assets> ~,hilc·non-e quity accounte~ for 32½.
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To.put this enothc r way 1 the Amzrican ftrrn 2lloued local inv~sto rs to
hold 75% of non-eq uity securi ties and o~ly 15l of equity securi ties.
This pattcrr i varies somewhat fron ~ountry to countr y, but not
greatly .

In Europe ) for e;rnrr.pl c, tl1e Arleric an subsidic.:!."ies and branch

plants borroi,

securi ties.

5!;~~

locally , of t-zhich M;%

is non:cq uity and G9½ equity

Europe ans o:-mecl 90;-'. of the non-eq uity securi ties outstan d

ing and only 15% of the equity securi ties.

Tl1ere are probab ly two

reason s ~1y local borrow ing in Europe is ~reate r than evcrae e: the

superi or capita l market s in Europe and the greate r propor tion of invest

me11t in manufa cturing , Phere· .short-- term li.?..bil i ties play

£'.

more irri-

portan t role.
One constr aint whic:1 accoun ts in part for this behavi or is risk

aversio n - a problem ,-;hich arises becaus-'~ _the firra is not truly internation al, but is in fact nation ql. Each fir~ is incorp orated in one
I
partic ular country and must pay its dividen ds in a ~artic ular currenc y;
whenev er it hc,s an uncove red asset in a foreit?,n countr y, it incurs
an exchan ge ris7~, and its policy will be to minimi ze this risk
subjec t

of course to cost condit ions.· An Americ an firm with assets in a sub-...,
sidiary in Franc~ worth two million dollars can reduce its exchan ge

risk to the ext~nt that it covers its invcst~ ent through borrotr inc in
France .

It iiill tend therefo re•'to borrot-r as much as possib lc or more
1

accura tely, to the point where the increa se in costs is greate r than

.

the increas e in risk.

By the same reasoni ng 1 a Furope an firm i7ith a

£:Ubsid fr.ry i~1 the United Suites t:ill borro,1 in A,12rica to cover
its

invesi:: .ient ther.::.

This is confir;:1 '2d in· £2.ct; foreigi' . co~,,panies inv2s~ -

ing in the United Stntcs follot1 the sa~2 ovei-a ll pattern describ ed

-23-·

above for /,oericr :n investm cnt.s.

They Lo1.'ro~? SOX of their subsi,l iar:tcs '

needs loc~lly (i.e., in the United Stites ), a32in largely in the form

.. ,:,f non-eq uity sccu:n. t :J. cs. 20
The second rn2jor cor1str air:t on t!1c intern ationa l fini"' s freeclo!!
!

- to borrou uh2.re cnpitc, l is cheape st is fr.~ ,~.es ire to maintv. in conple
te

c6ntr~1 - of its subsid iary.
.

.

Becaus e Ancricz n aD.<l other r:1ultfo.c1tion<!.l

.

fir.r.1s, :i.n the. p8.st at leest, hf.V~ been very reluctc '!nt to sell equity
·secur ities in their subsid i2ries, the amount they can bcirrow .in a coun
try is B.n.dte d by the avail2 .sility of non-2q uity source s o-f finc:nc
e.

"The reason for refusin g to sell e~uity securi ties is in part the
desire to maint2 in contro l of the su~sid inry, but this is not the co~~
plctc expl2n ition, since in prectic c, the parent fire holds well
above tha 50Z 00nQrs hip necess ary for effecti ve contro l; as noted
above~ it is over 80%.
profit s

Their desire to ca~ture all -~he monopo ly

';

2n~

qJasi- rcnts associa ted with their subsid iary explain s

this to so8e extent .
The r.1ulti. natiorw l finn is a means for ceritra lizin5 decisio n

lilaking .

Its goal of harmon izing policie s in differe nt· countr ies in ...

order to maximi ze ~orld- tdde profit may be diffic ult to accomp lish if
the firm is ericurnbcred. by the problem s of l9c2l intere st.

.••

To allou

local pa~tic ipation re-i~tr oduccs soMe of the very forces tl1at direct
.
~
investt. 12nt is desi,sn cd to avoid.

Local s~s.reh old~rsJ interes ted only

in the profit s of their partic ular subsid iary, •rould not take into
consid er~tion the repercu ssion~ of their _polici es on branch plants 2n
oth-~r countr ies.

YC!t if these itr.portc,C'.t repc,rc ussions _2.re ir,nore d,

_, glol)~l pr-o.f its r,:ill fall short of the r,~axir..tiil.

The fin! therefo re

attempts to cc:pture all profits in orc!cr to ma;-:fr:dze tl1em fully.

21

Legal restrictions, improv2d capital markets, and a divorce of
equity end control may lead to increased local s~le of equity sccuri-

ties. ·'l'his 1-mulcl 9rohably reduce fur the-.:- the flm,r of c2.pital associated with international business integration, since the equity securities· account for the mc:j or floi;-1 at present.

The· role of multinational

firms ~i's a substitute for international fincnc:i.al intermediaries would

·be reduced.

Wi may note finally the possibility of a curious relaiionship
bet.ween direct investment and the interest rate, ~-,hich follows froo
the fact t11at firfus tend ·to borro0 40 or 50% of the financial needs

of their subsidiary locally in the co.1ntry of operatfon.

The more

eipensive is capital in a country, the higher the cost on this borrowing, and this provides an incentive to borro11 a smaller prop~rtion
I

I

locally in the country thnt has the highest interest rates.
extend the flou of direct investment t-iiJ.l be incr~nscd.
an effect in the opposite direction as well.

To this

But there is

The high interest rates·

red_uce profits and discourage investment; in other uords, it can re---
duce the in-flow of direct investment because it reduces levercge on
that investment.
•

VI
Direct investr nent involv es a pacl-:aGe of rwnc13e:rnent s!dlls , technical knoulc dge, .ri.nd capit?. l, and

ft

should brini a triplet 0£ hcneU. ts;

the lendin3 country shou~d gain becuas e its manage rs, tecln1i cinns, and

capita l receive a hiRhcr rate of return abroad than they could at hcree,
and the recipie nt country g~ins bccnus~ it.rece ives these factors
of

pro·duc tion at a Joper cost than it could provide them itself, if •indeed
·
it could provide them at all.
There is also anothe r side.

The presenc e of multina tj_onal firms

affec:'t s the_ dQgree of compe tition in an indus,t ry, a Ed as a result
l

· its price and output .

Dheri these are tcl~cn into consid eration ~ no

• 1e s t c>. •..:ei11Cn t s o f· uni· versa
s1mp
1 b ene.:.r 1..:
· • are poss 1."b1
,_e.

The effects

cliff er for the fin,1, for each of. the countr ies; ct"nd fot· the \7or1d.

While the fira may be presum ed to benefi t, or to think it benefi ts,

as otherw ise it would not. unclert ake the investm ent, uorld-1 ncome may
rise or fall, .depcn<li_ng on uh ether coopct ition and cf ficienc y is in.•

creased or decreas ed; and either or both- of the receiv ing and lending
countr ies tilay gain or lose, depend ing on uhere the benefi ts and bur

dens fall.
The most trciuble some aspect of public policy on direct invest -

ment ii that, to be adequa te, it must be intern ationa l in scope.

The effect is widesp iea~, and all countr ies must cooper ate is policy
is to remove rather t~an aggrav ate the

problc □.

.

Since countr ies differ
.

so _ereatl y in their views and intere sts, it is_ diffic ult to see hoi-1
c9oper atfon to r.1itiga te the bad effects of direct investo .ent znd to
distrib ute the benefi ts equitab ly could be obt~in~ d.

Differ ent atti-

'tudes towDrds compet ition and planPi1 ~ vou!d.h ave to be reconc iled,

-26as uell as differc11t interests in the uay t!1e gains fror.1 direct investmcnt are sl1arcd.

Yet howev2r difficult , coop2rati on on a global basis

is essentia l; independs nt action by ouc country or one group of·countries would conflict with the interest of others and would probably result in retaliati on.

Already, sicns of 6~tually antagoni stic rather

.than mutually beneficia l policies can be observed.

Broadly spe~kinc, if cooperati on could be achieved 3 one can
envisage three types of remedies to the r,roblems created by the inter-,

nationc=ll U.rm.
The first alternati ve is ~o ~o nothing.

The complexit y of the

problem provides ·a strong argllinen·t for this approach.

Every case of

internati onal business integrati on has its positive and neg2tive asJ>Ccts, an<l it is difficult to tell ~.,hcther it reduces costs or merely

increases profits without enhancin3 the general welfare.

There is

reason to quc~tion uhethcr governme nts in these circumsta nces ~ould
be able to evaluate correctly cJnc1 recommend appropria tely·.

Governmer!t

errors in correctin g the problem might turn out to ~e worse than the
problem itself.

The substant ial benefits of foreign fovestmen t may be

lost in the attempt to remove deficienc ies.

Under this view, the

best thing uould be to rely on competiti ori, imperfect as it is, to
rectify the problcm 3 an<l to hofle that the p1·oblel1 is transitor y, ·

that oligopoly positions will erode through time, and that benefits

uill outweich costs. ·
A second line of attnck is control and resulatio n of multinnti on2l

~ulation, and ~~1en it is imocrfec t, the argument for planning is ...strength-

-27ened.

Under this v5.cH, constituted _authoritie s, jointly or imlepe.nc1-

ently, would prescribe good behavior for internation al companies, and

regulate their policies on investment, enployraent, purchase~ and sales.
: Gtddelj_nes and laws of this n2t.ure a:re already j_n force :1.n nearly

..every country; anci they see,:1 likely to gro_w.

A; third approach Hould be to atte::m~t to reI.:1ove, or at least lessen,
barriers to entry ;,,n<l to increase competition .

Even where coi:1.petition

is no~ regarded as a goal, this t-wuld be of help, since by redud.ng_
the power of internation al firms, government control trould-be ~ade easier.
It ndght be useful to state _briefly a number of policies which m:!.ght
be considered.
1, Since nn irnport~nt advant2ge of large firms ii their superior

access to capitDl, steps could be tal~en to inprove the capital market.
By ma1~ing capital more reedily available in countries where H is not,

the advantage of foreign firms might be reduced.

The direct costs of

subsidizing a good capital market -might.be far less than the hidden
cost of conglomerat e enterprise and high concentrati on.
·2. In addition, it t!lay be possible to restrain sorne•-1hat the ,-1ay--,

in which firms use their advantage.

For exc1raple, tactics designed to

exclude new competition could be restricted, and entry encourejed.
To this encl, there is need for an investigati on of exclusive dealing

arrangemen ts, tied sales, full line forcing, adninistrat ion of patent
rights, etc.
•
t o nvain,
•
22 t h.e most 1Qportant
.
,Qa:rier
•
3 • Accor <l in~
to entry,

discovered by detailed study, ~as pro~uct differentia tion.

If this pre

vails in the internation al econoray as.well, it su3sests tl1e advent2g~s

.....•

.-

-28of consll::1er educa tion ffi,<l -prote ction.
.I

It r,1ight thc:ce fore be 2d-vis2 .ble

to limH sales p:ro;;{ otior:a l activ ities nnd prov:Ld 8 in:for,n 2t:i.on
servic es
to count er its effec ts.

4. There collld also be an attack on the proble ~ of resour ce
monop olizati on.

The ~clvan tagc of nultin atloaa l firms somet i~es lies in

con.tr ol of a strate gic nei;r mater ial.

Steps might be taken to moke

this raw mater ial availa ble to all on an equal basis.

(At the same time,

the countr y ,~ere the raw mater ial is locate d, often an undcrd
ev~lop ed
count1 ·y, migh.t be able to get a better share .than it does ,-,1wn
dealin g
with large oligo polist ic firros! )
5. Comp etition could also be increa sed by reRovi ng those
tariff
and other barrie rs which protec t- monop olies.

Thfs i-·ould rwke it _easie r

fo·r a small firm to enter r.iarl~e ts uithol lt cs tablish i,1 pro(1u
ction
0
facili ties in a foreir n countr y.·

6. In certai n cases , it might b~ desira ble to preven t expan
sion

of certai n firr:is or even to force a dissol ution.
soluti on, but it has been used in certai n cases

This.i s an extreo c

in

the United States ,

and may also be ac!van tagcou s in an intern ationa l contex t.

We might

end on the follod .ng note=· discus sions of intcnw ti.ona
l

busine ss often contai n a large elemen t of nation alism;
count ries feel
that what is good

fer

ti1eir busine ss fhms is eood for the countr y, and

try to promo te their. ip.ter ests.

Americ a suppo rts A:~eri can firms becaus e

they- are /'J;leri can, while foreig n count ries objec t to the:n
for the sam2
reason .

Re suGge st that th~ proble m shoulJ he vie~~d . fro2 _e uore
glob2 l

·of the r::ost ir::por tant prc:ibl e~s are asso•:f ofcd ~-dth size end
r.1z,-cl:et

-29rather then with nationa lity, and more attehtio n should be focused on
these aspects .

tJOTES ·
1

one of th~ first articl es to an2lyz c the specia l behav ior of these
lnrge intei:n atio"<r nl fi·ri::.S is M. Bye's ;.Sclf- Yimm ced !\1.lt
iterrl torial
Units and their Ti,,.!c· Horizo n. 11 (Intcr. .natio nal Ec:ono ;dc
Pc1per s, ?fo. -8,
New Yor1~: The !-r2c:;d lla1! Co., 1958)
The other pi.onc er in thi.s c"L"Cea is
E. 'T. Penros e.
("Fore ign· Investi ~.ent and the Gror,th of the Finn, ll Econom
ic
Journ al, LXVI, Ju:ic 1956; "Prof it .Shari ns bctuec n Produc
ing Corno.2.nies___ _
;-;d-01
1 Co~nt d.es in the 1-!iclclle Ea.st,' ' Econo:,lic Journ d, LXIX, June 1959;
and ' 1Vei~U.co.l Integ ration uith Joint" Cont~ ·olof Ra,~·- ::;tcria
l Produ ction, "
1-J:!.~__;Journpl __2_f_~~-..,·c)o-.io.-2nt St1,1d=!:_es, Vol. I, ·!~o. 3, April
1965) Profes sor
C. P. K:lndJ. cb-2rge r has also stress ed the friport r.nce of
the intcrri ation,2 .l
izatio n of the firm to intern ationa l resour ce alloca tion
effici ency and
_ the analog y t:o the e~erge n.ce·o r the nat:i.o nal firm in the
United States
at the turn of the centur y.
(Inten iation 2.l E~_0noz,1:i.cs Tld.rcJ Editio n,
Homew ood, Illino is: Rick·.. rd D._ Irvin c, Co., 1963,, pp.
/,0!1-!1 22: and.
"Europ ean Inte& ration and th~ Intern ationa l Corpo ration
,:, Colura bia
Jo_un~_l_.9.f I!o::-ld_J_}_usin~ss~ Vol. IJ Ho. 1 H:i.n_te r 1%6, p.
65) See also
5
J. Houssi au:--:, nLa grande entrep risc plud.nc ttion:c ~le: 1 and G.
Stein er,
1
' La planif icatio n des gr2.Hd
es entrep rises mt.ilti1 --.ntioe 2le." (Econo:-.iie
Appliq uee, XVII, April- Septer !lber 1%!:.)
$

2

c.

P. Kindl eberge r, Interr. ationc :.l Econor .iics,

OiJ.

dt., p. 419.

3

carl Kays en nnd Donald F. Tur~1e r, frntitr~1:.s t P9].i~ , C~mhric.lgc:
llarva rd Unive rsity Press , 1959, p. 19.

5

A. Fortas , Forew ord to A. D. 1'Ieale , The AntH rust Laws
of the U. S. A.,
Cambr idge: Cambr idge Unive rsity Press , 1962, .P· vi.

6

E. S. Mason , Prefac e to Kaysen and Turne r, .£R· ·cit., p. xii.

7

1n- the United Kingdo m, for ·exenp le, uhcre ~he best histo'r
:i.cal in
forma tion is availa ble, fully one hc:lf of the e,:1pJ.oylilent
in United States
contro lled enterp rises is in firms establ ished before 1914.
(J. H.
Dunni ng, /1.n!ed.can ~_nvcst,:,_ents in Britis h ~1anu£a cturin ~
Indus try, London :
Georg e Allen 2nd 1Jr.uin, 1958, p. 95) iioreo ver, these statis
tics refer to
the date on which the bra.nch plan.t bee an opera ting. The
releva nt concep t
is the date the oaren t firm first went abroad . If data were availa
ble
on this basis~ it would indica te a mu~1 smalle r per cent of
invest ment
being accoun ted for by ·nc,·: entran ts.
.
. Estim ates for A.r;izri c2n inves t0ent in other count ries
are not as
detail ed, but date the be3inn ings of direct investm ei'.t to at
least before ,
1930. The 1957 Census (Unite d States Dcp2.rt ms-nt of Coc'i;;:;~erct,,
..!::!_'..._~:
Bn~J·•,:- ,.:-c; Tp,--,c-~ -.-...,r-.,, 1·-. T~o-"J ··tt' Co·,rr-r
;,...,,. c"""'l'" ' of 1957 r:r..,s!iic1,·•·0·1 •
Gcver n~ent Prirtti nz Offic2 1 19G0, p. 50) sho~2d that 65 per
c~nt 6f·tot ril
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j_nvestn8nt (at that tin:e)
concentra tcd in pl,mts ?hich were cstclblish,:,d
before 19~6. Since few plnnts were established citl1cr <lurini the depression
or the war, n1ost of these plants must have started before 1930. This is

confin1cc.1

:in

th2 1950 CetlSUS (United States tiep,~rtir.ent of CO:i'J!;Cl"C('., _Qir_~~~

Private Fo,:ej_f;•l Inv,2.2.t,,,snts of the Urii tcd St.:t!:es: ___ Census of 1950, Hm;hinz-·
ton: Governr:cnt P::.:-:i.nU.nzr, Office, 1953), H!lich :found that a.lmost 60 per
cent of th2 investr;,.c.nts at that U.rne were in plnnts es~nblishcd before
1930.
Other evidence on the venerabilit y of most foreign investora can be
found i.n the cz.se h:Lstories report in c. Lew_i_s, America's StJ:.l_kc in Int.?_z
nnt:i.onal_ Invcstric~1ts (Fashi~gton 1 D. C.: The DrooI~ings Instit1.1t:i.on , 1933);
R. Harslrnll, F. A. Southard, and I-:. Taylor, ~_anac15an-l'.meris-..?I1 Inch.•.sti;_y_
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936) ~ D. H. Phelps, H:i.~ratio~ i
Jn<l1._!._s_~.D~to So,•.th Ane_ri~ (1!2.~-1 York: NcGrau-Eill P.ook Co., 1936): and
F. A. Southard, Art~erican Industry in Europe (Boston: Hotighton H:i.fflin
Co., 1931). In this lost uork, Southard was able to trace the orieins
of many firms back to the late 19th ccntu~y .
. Direct investment by foreigners in the United States cppears also
to bd in old, well-establ ished subsidiarie s.· Of the 6 biliion dollars
of direct investment in the United States, almost GO per cent were
estnhlishe< l before 19l1J.. (U. S. Departnent of Co1::it~crce, Fo_reif{n I\usj~T}_ess
_lnvestt(lent in the United States_, Vashington: Goverm,tent Pri.Eting Office,
1961, p. liO)
8

.
.
In Can2da, for example, the share of foreign firms hos shmm 110 ·
tendency to fall c>.ncl is incre2.sir.g.
(Goverm1ent of Can2.c1a, Do~ninion
Bureau of Statistics, C2nada's Internation al Investment Position. 1926195/i, Ottaua: Queen's Printer, 1958) In E;glaml Dunning f ounc1 only a
very slight decline, helped by the war) in the A.med.can share of British
industry.
(Dunning, E.2.· c:i.t., p. 1311, Of the 115 firms questioned,
only 15 claimed that their share decreased; 63 firms reported an increase, and 37, no change.) In· the United States, in some industries,
£iris formerly owned by foreisners have given way to local firms; but
these t•.'ere special cases resulting from the war, when- German subsid
iaries were seized an<l some British firms sold to m2·ct exchange re
quirements of the United Kingdom. Some of the British firms have '•
since bought back their interes_ts.
(See Dcpartr:1ent of Cou,mcrce, For
ei.r,n Business Investsents in the United Stc>.tes, ££· £it., p. 3, for
.a description of past investments in the United States and the reasons
for.the disappearan ce of some of them.)

9

up till no•,.,, s-ome of the most important acts of governr.,ent policy
towards direct investment have'been connected to balance of payments
problems. Direct invcstraent has bee~ treated as onothar form of c~pital
and the flon of funds associatecl with it so;cietises perr.titterl, som~tir.1es
not~ acc~rding to balence of payments.c riteria. This involves an at•tempt to manipulate a long~term factor for_short-t er~ purposes, ancl has
many undesirable coas~quence s. Firms, on the oth-~r hc.-id, acconlin3 to
a· study by the rational IndustriGl Confci2nc~ ~card, have te~cn a
dccirlcdJ.y di~i:erent vie,.!. T~ey 2.re· r-,ot as r,1ue'.1 conce:.:-r:ed nith short-

•

.':.

.

;• .

prof:lt rates {n m.:11:ing ir-.vzstment decisions v.3 \7:i.th t~1e ';prot.cction of
competitive. position in a mm·ket. :• The rl:i.sc:ussicn of this Pf".per su~gests
. that e.n h1portcnt guide for public policy be protc~ction of compcthive
perfon.12nce.
(Judd Poll-:, Irene H. !'.eistcr; Lc:l·Ter,ce A. Veit J _1L.~..•
Production Ahro?..ci .:\PC- the Dalance of Pay~tcr.ts, :reu York: ifational
Industrial Conference Roardl 1966)

10

United State:, Dcparti!icr:t of Corr:rnercc, Unite~ States Business
lPvestr~cnt in Foreign Co1:!ntd.~~, 'fas!.lin-:;ton: Goverme1er,t Printer" 1~57,

p'.1)~!1.

· 11ihe list cf firms was obtained from an investigation of financial
reports.

Asset size uas o1;tained fros:1 the 196l: £grtune D_irectory.
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The list of fin~s is roughly the sene as the one used above.
Concentration ratios Here tal·:en fror-: the U. S. Ser<!te, Concer!tratio::i
in Ainericc1.n }!1d1:!_str.Y.., P-erort of tbe Subco,,nittec or,..~ntitru;t e.1:d ii;nop
oly pursuant to S. Res. 57 (25th Con?ress), Table 17, p. 23. The firms
were classified according to their major product, but their direct
· investrnents··are ofteP- restricted to or1e or tuo speci.2,lt:i.es in ~1h:i.cl~ the
firm has particular advantages. Concentration ratios ir: these special
ties are rnuch hiBher a better industry definition woul~ therefore
show an even stronrrcr association betwcen_investsc~t and high concen- trption.
Moreover, many fir!ns were in iE<lustries ,,here procuct differentia
tion t,:as important and Phcre the concentre.t;i.on rc>.tio is a poor index
of market position because of the difficulty of defining an industry.
The industries of high concentration (32 firDs) ~ere:

75-100% Concentration
----,-------

Cereal, B~eakfast Foods
2
Chewing Gun
2
Flavoring for Soft Drinks 3 Hard Surface Floor
. Coverfogs
.
1
Tires & Inner Tubes
5
Flat Glass
1
Tobacco
1
Aluminum
1
Tin Cans & Other Tirnmre
Razors l Razor Blades

Computing !fachines &
Typeuriters
.Sewing ?-'achiP.cs
Shoe Machinery
Motor Vehicles
Locomotives & Perts

2 ·

1
4
1
1
6
1
32

. The following infustries ~ere in the 50-74% ratio bracket (11 firms):
50-74~ Concentrati
on
·-·-------Biscuits & Crackers
1
Corn Fet Filljni;
·1
A1rasiv!:!s
~Asbestos
1
Photograph ic Equipment
1
Cleanin 6 l, P-olisl'j_n3
Soaps & Glyceri~e
2
. ·p1umbine Fixtures
2
Elevators & Escalators
1
Vacuum Cleaners
1
11

In the 25-49Z concentrati on r~tio brac~et (2~ firms) were:
25-49% Concentrati on
Heat Products
·4
Dairy Products
2
Canne:d .Fruits {, Vegs.
3
Flour (, Fe'2.1
1
Ceffient
l
Refractorie s
1
Surgical AppU;:.r.ces
1
Mattresses & ~e~ Springs 1
l~dicinal 1 ChcRical,
& Pharmaceut ical
Preparation s
6
Pai~ts i Varnishes
l
Tractors & Farm i-fachinery 5·
Oil Field Machi~ery &
Tools
1
Printing Trade Equipment
& Hachinery
1
28

I

l-.

'

I,

O~e firm, Constructio n

& Minini Machinery, was· in industry ~ith less than

25% concentrati on, and foi t~enty-six others, it was not possible to

• assign concentrati on ratios due to the diversified nature of the firms.
13

n1.mning·, .£Q• cit., p. lp, Horeover, this is probably an underestimate, since differenti2 ted 1 products play an importnat role in some
of the unconcentrn tcd industries, e.g., foundation garments> propri~tary
medicines, beauty and toilet preparation s.
lli

I. Brecher and S. S. Reisman, Canada-Unit ed States Econo~ic

· Rel~iQ_ns, Ot tc>.'·'ct:

1957.

Royal Co::1 □ issio.1 on C2.nada' s Ecot10mic Prospects,

Also, Dc"-1.inion 3urc:,.u of Statistics} 90.

s;_g_.
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1
1

~F. A. Southard, knerican_Industrv in_Euro9e, Bostoni Roughton
Mifflin Co., 1931. See esp2cia!ly l1is com~ents oa the electrical equip
ment j_nclust.r,, p. 36; telephone_ aarl. telegraphic c-:quip,!\en.t, p. 55; petro
leum, p. 60, 68-69; motor vehicles) p. 29; mines and fol~taJ.s) p. 93;
phonographs, p. 103; and locks end keys, p. 108. Also sec G. Y. Bertin,
· ·1 1:i.r/,,cstj_ssC:;·,12nt ·a~s fin::es e~rc~E:eres en Frc1_~ce, P. U. F., 1963.
16

D. T. Brash, United States Investn~nt in f,ustr2.1ian rJm1ufc1cturin<:!.
_I_ngnstry, Doctor2l Dissertation, I.tis trali2n i'~c:tional University, August
l.965.

liln the case of vertical integration, an improvement in coor
dination would tend to improve efficiency of allocation _on both counts.
Suppose He have·a monopolist, A, se~ling to .:1nothcr finil, B, which is
in turn a monopolist in another market, A·doublc distortion is involved
j.n this case of scqu2ntinl monop0ly; if A ai1d B integrnte or collucle
perfect1y to rnm:i;:lize joint profits) they ui'll re;Pove one of the dis
tortions _and in so doing,· i:icreas12 output and _lo,,er price.

18

Kay sen and Turner, op. cit. , p. 9.

19

c.

Iverson, lnternatior,2.l C21)~tal J.iover.,Cr!~_§., London: Oxford
University Press, 1935, p. 146. Ohlin 1:iakes the s2;:1e point and is
quoted by Iverson. See B. Ohlin, Interrer:;ionc!:_2-_~ncl. Intcrnationa~
Trade, Cambridge: llarvard University Press~ 1935, p. 334.
20U. S.
DeparLmenL of Commerce, Foreign Business Investment in
·the United States, .22· cit,
L

L
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We may state the argur.ient more precisely as follous:
dire.ct
investment occurs because the profits of an enterprise in one country,
._ w1 , is dependent on the profits of an enterprise in anbther country ►,

w , i.e.,
2

(1)
To maximize global prqfits (w

1

+ n2 ) the

following must hold:

(2)
-1

Suppose, however, that th~ parent firm owns the ~nterprise in country 1
·fully, but only~ per cent of the ~nterprise in ccu~try 2. Then it will

whi-ch only fuliy cxplo:.i.ts globaJ. interdependence if ;>.. equds 1. The
_-analysis assumes that firms try to maximize total-profits lesally bc
loneing to shareholdr2rs of the parent firm. An alternative assu•nption
is that firms vie:~, all dividends, including those paid to shc:lrehoJ.<lers
in the home country~ as a cost, and attempt to maximize retained earnings.
Le~tinz d and d be clividcnJs p2icl in cou.ntry 1 and country 2 respectively,
2
1
the firm maximizes (n

+ u2 - a1 , -d 2 )

insteed of (u

- An ) as above.
1
2
Provided dividends in each c6untry do not dep~n<l on profits-earned in
that country, i.e.> they depend only on total profits and the conditions
prcvailine in the capital market in ~ach country, equity securities
introduce no distorlio~ in the production decision of the type described
above result. I am grateful to Hrs. E. Penrose for this point.
22

1

J. S. nain 1 Barriers to t!£u Conpetition; Cambridge:
University Press, 1956.
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